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Peacekeeping and FM 100-5: Do They Match?

A Monograph
by
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Spara
Infantry



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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

PEACEKEEPING AND FM 100-5: DO THEY MATCH? by LTC Jeffrey L. Spara, USA, 63 pages.

The focus of this monograph is the evaluation of the principles of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as listed in the June 1993 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 in peacekeeping operations. Military commanders and decision makers must understand these principles not only in the current environment, but also in historical context. Understanding these principles should lead to better understanding of their utility and application.

The monograph presents the principles and applies them to the 1960 United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC) to gain historical perspective. The principles are evaluated through a modification of the Cohen and Gooch five step process which they presented and used in their book Military Misfortunes.

The monograph conclusion covers the support for the OOTW principles in ONUC and some considerations for future peacekeeping operations. The critical principles in ONUC were objective, legitimacy, and restraint. The other principles were less supported. ONUC also highlighted the difficulty of a "Chapter 6 1/2" operation which appears to have a seamless transition from "peace" to "war." The need for additional emphasis in FM 100-5 on the multi-national nature peacekeeping is pointed out. The monograph concludes with the need to constantly evaluate the OOTW principles not only horizontally but also vertically in any peacekeeping operation.

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I Introduction

The collapse of the familiar bipolar structures of the Cold War is creating a new world order symbolized by events in Russia, Somalia, Bosnia, and other countries. To keep pace with this change Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has come to be a formal part of United States Army doctrine. OOTW, which includes peacekeeping operations, are addressed in the June 1993 edition of the U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. As National Military Strategy and Army doctrine attempts to define peacekeeping there is increasing concern focused on policy and strategy of UN directed peacekeeping operations. The number and difficulty of recent UN peacekeeping operations greatly exceeds the previous 40 years of UN activities. FM 100-5 lays out post-Cold War OOTW principles for military commanders and planners. The roots of peacekeeping as we know it today are, however, found in the Cold War past. Peacekeeping was in a large respect a response to the environment and conditions of that time. Of importance to military decision makers and planners is an understanding of the current OOTW principles of objective, unit of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security in a historical context. Understanding these principles in a historical context should lead to a better understanding of their utility and true worth in current and future peacekeeping operations.

This paper seeks to examine the utility of the OOTW principles in support of the requirements for peacekeeping operations. An historical perspective is achieved by applying the OOTW principles to a Cold War UN peacekeeping operation. The selected operation is the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964. ONUC is important because it historically sets the foundation for all following UN peacekeeping operations. It also falls

into an area called chapter 6 1/2 or "enforced peacekeeping." (1) An evaluation of the current OOTW principles in this operation is done by using an adaptation of the five step process used by Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch in their book Military Misfortunes. (2) The body of this monograph is built around three sections. Section II covers ONUC with primary focus on the first two years. The Cohen and Gooch five stage approach and its modification for this monograph are presented in Section III. Section IV is an analysis of the OOTW principles in ONUC using the adaptation laid out in Section III. Although the OOTW principles are written for the military, the principles are important enough to be considered at all levels in peacekeeping operations. The principal findings and conclusions are summarized in the last section.

II. United Nations Operations in the Congo, 1960 - 1964

The Congo crisis of 1960 has all the traditional elements for what is now considered a historical place for UN peacekeeping and perhaps a model for future operations in the new world order. The Congo was a newly emergent state in an area of instability and decolonization that was considered a "fringe" area between Western and Soviet influence. (3) The size of Western Europe with a population 14 million, the Congo of 1960 had seventy major ethnic groups in two hundred tribes spread through its six provinces of Equateur, Kasai, Kivu, Leopoldville, Orientale and Katanga. The French language and Catholic faith were the only unifying factors outside of the Belgian colonial system. In 1960 ten per cent of the copper, sixty per cent of the cobalt, and most of the radium for the world came from Katanga. Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga with sales of over \$200 million was the world's third largest copper producer. Katanga also provided half the metals for non-communist countries jet engines and radars. (4) It was the economic heart of the Congo and a Western area of interest.

Continued unrest in Leopoldville and Stanleyville from January to November 1959 lead to the Brussels Round Table Conference of January 1960. The events in the Congo forced the Belgian government to consider seriously Congolese independence and set the stage for self rule.

The long years of Belgian paternalistic colonialism failed to prepare the Congolese for self rule.(5) There was no broad national party in the tribal make up of the country. Limited expression of self rule were manifest in the elections of 1957 and they were restricted to the three largest cities Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Jadotville. Top and middle administrative position in the government were held by 9,000 Belgians. Force Publique, the security force for the Congo established in July 1891, was officered by European Officers only, mostly Belgian. Force Publique's mission was to secure the borders, protect property, and maintain law and order. Loyalty to Force Publique generally transcended tribal loyalties, and was reinforced by the colonial policy of stationing soldiers outside their tribal areas. Congolese could rise only to NCO and warrant officer ranks. Force Publique was a major force combating the nationalist movements of 1959.(6)

Real independence for the Congo was not apparently part of the Belgian plan. The Belgians had set up the pre-condition for a weak Central Congolese government especially in dealing with the tribal rivalries. This would allow the Belgians to divide and rule an "independent" Congo. This was especially true of the resource rich province of Katanga.(7) The Belgians held the view that the lack of technically trained Congolese would mean continued Belgian control. Belgian expectation's and attitude's toward the new Congo were graphically reflected by the Force Publique commander, Lieutenant General Emil Janssens, who wrote "Before Independence - After Independence."(8)

The Round Table Conference proposed a four year transition to independence, but Congolese leaders sought and won a compressed six month plan. An "Executive College" was established in March 1960 and comprised six Congolese leaders to serve as a transitional regime and drafters of a constitution. Among the six are three that played a major roles in the future Congo crisis: Joseph Kasavubu, Patrice Lumumba, and Moise Tshombe.

Joseph Kasavubu, at the time 50, was a leader of the Bakongo tribe which was centered along the Atlantic coast and included the area of the national capitol, Leopoldville. His Alliance de Ba-kongo (ABAKO) favored federal structures with a large degree of autonomy in the provinces. Patrice Lumumba, than 35, was a nationalist and leader of Movement Nationale Congolaise (MNC) whose power base was in the northeast around Stanleyville. MNC's goal was for one nation with strong unitary structures. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, "suspected Lumumba of planning a communist takeover." (9) Moise Tshombe, 42, lead a coalition party of southern Katangan tribes, the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT). Considered pro-west, he tried to secede before independence day, but was prevented by the Belgian government. As the future leader of Katanga he appointed Belgians to Katangan civil administration and military (Katanga gendarmerie) leadership positions.

Elections to provincial assemblies and national parliament were held in May 1960. Lumumba's MNC party won a plurality in both houses of Parliament, 33 seats out of 137 seats. (10) Lumumba formed his government one week prior to Independence Day, 1 July 1960. The Congo was admitted to the United Nations six days later with Kasavubu as the elected Head of State by new Parliament. Tshombe's CONAKAT party barely won the

majority in the Katanga provincial assembly to elect him provincial president. Just prior to independence, 30 June 1960, Force Publique was renamed Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC). Lumumba asked Dr Ralph Bunche, Under Secretary-General UN, for assistance in training the newly renamed ANC. Dr Bunche was prepositioned in the Congo by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in early May. The Secretary-General anticipated problems from the events he saw developing in the Congo and Africa.(11)

Not unexpected inter-tribal conflict broke out in Leopoldville and Luluabourg on 2 July. What was unexpected, however, was the 5 July ANC mutiny. Pay and promotion were cited as the causes.(12) Concerned for the safety of 100,000 Belgium citizens in the Congo, Belgium asked to use their metropolitan troops to reinforce the 3,000 Belgium Paratroopers stationed at the Congolese bases of Kitona and Kamina (a NATO base established for the defense of Central Africa).(13) Use of Kitona and Kamina were part of the signed but unratified Belgium-Congo Treaty of Friendship. This request was refused by Lumumba as he struggled with the internal problem. Over 1,300 women and children fled into neighboring Brazzaville the night of 7 and 8 July. Most of these were Belgian. On 9 July Belgians unilaterally flew reinforcements into Kitona and Kamina. They moved out into Elisabethville, the port of Matadi, Leopoldville, and Jadotville secured the European quarters and restored order on 10 July. The Belgian troop build up continued and 10,000 troops were in country by 19 July.(14) The Belgian government attempted to legitimize their intervention, like Britain and France during the 1956 Suez Crisis, by claiming humanitarian intervention. The Belgians relied on this theme in all future efforts to gain the UN collaboration and support in the crisis. The stated Belgian position was that

troops would withdrawn once the Secretary-General assured "the safety of Belgian nationals."(15)

With the introduction of Belgian paratroopers into Katanga, Tshombe declared the secession of Katanga on 11 July. Tshombe's declaration was, however, opposed by the Baluba tribe of Northern Katanga. The Baluba tribe was split by the Northern Katanga border and Southern Kasai province. In August the Baluba of Kasai also declared their secession. In the turmoil of the time three Congolese Central Government ministers independently asked the US Ambassador for US troops to restore order. The Ambassador refereed them to the UN. Events now moved rapidly.

On 12 July Kasavubu and Lumumba cabled the United Nations requesting UN military assistance against the Belgian intervention. Their first cable to the UN Secretary-General sought protection for the national territory of the Congo. A second cable also arrived that informs the Secretary-General that if help was not provided the Central Congolese Government would seek outside assistance. Lumumba convinced Kasavubu to join him in seeking assistance from Soviet Premier Nikitia Khrushchev.(16) Under an urgent message from Hammarskjold the Security Council met on the 13th. The Central Congolese Government also clarified their 12 July request on the 13th by stating that their request was not to restore internal order but to expel the Belgians. In the early morning of 14 July the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 4387 (S/4387) which called on "Belgium to withdraw its troops, and authorizes the Secretary-General to provide the military assistance required."(17) Tunisian and Ghanaian troops were on the ground in the Congo 48 hours after the resolution passed. Lumumba also received assistance from the leader of Ghana. Ghanaian troops under MG Alexander, Ghanaian British Chief of Defense Staff, arrived in the Congo before UN

troops. These troops became the first troops of ONUC. UN troops from eight countries reached a strength of 11,000 by the end of July. Hammarskjold selected Major General Carl Von Horn (a Swede), and some of the headquarters staff from the Von Horn's United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East for the Congo mission.

Von Horn soon clashed with the civilian leadership in the Congo, most noticeably Dr Bunche. The task ahead for MG Von Horn exceeded his ability and temperament. He threatened to resign three times within the first month. During critical events he was absent due to health problems.(18) He departed the Congo and was replaced by MG Sean McKeown, Irish Army, in January 1961.

Lumumba continued to push for quick UN action because he feared that Katanga secession would become a "fait accompli." The Belgian people and government supported maintaining and using force in the Congo. They also felt that they were in Katanga at the request of that legitimate government.(19)

Lumumba's concern over Katanga was justified. By 23 July Belgian forces were withdrawn from the Congo except in Katanga.(20) Tshombe declared his determination to resist UN deployment into Katanga on 3 August. Dr Bunche, now the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo, went to Katanga on 4 August to confront Tshombe. Bunche concluded that a UN operation in Katanga would compromise the impartial attitude and peaceful status of UN forces. His 5 August report to Hammarskjold stated that "Katanga was determined to resist by force any attempt to bring the United Nations troops."(21)

Hammarskjold was determined to force the issue with Tshombe. On 26 July Hammarskjold pressed Bunche and MG Von Horn on the projected date

for UN troops entry into Katanga. The Secretary-General was committed to the concept of a single territory of the Congo for four specific reasons: 1.) the UN admitted the Congo as a "single territorial" entity on 7 July; 2.) the Belgian-Congo Treaty of Friendship was never ratified; 3.) the Congolese independence structure established by Loi Fondamentale (for one single state) was agreed to by all Congolese leaders; and, 4.) the Security Council Resolution of 14 July was to give assistance to the Congo Government.(22) In spite of Tshombe's objection, a 300 man Swedish contingent entered Katanga on 12 August. The contingent was personally lead by Hammarskjold. Belgian troops except those seconded in Tshombe's gendarmerie (in reality the Katangan Army) depart Katanga in September 1960. The Katanga gendarmerie was set up after Belgians neutralized the ANC in Katanga.(23) As Tshombe backed down a new crisis started in Kasai province that continued to under cut the Central Congolese Government and lead to months of confused action and reaction by UN and Congolese forces.

Albert Kalonji, leader of the Baluba tribe in Kasai, proclaimed statehood for his tribe. He joined Katanga in succeeding form the Central Government. Lumumba responded on 23 August by using 100 Soviet trucks and 16 Ilyushin transports and crews to move ANC soldiers into southern Kasai to crush the newest rebellion. Their subsequent movement was to be into Katanga. Lumumba's forces, however, committed atrocities in south Kasai that caused a leadership crisis in the Central government.(24)

On 5 September Kasavubu as Head-of-State announced the dismissal of Lumumba and appointed Josepho Ileo to form a government. Earlier, on 27 August, Kasavubu confided to Andrew Cordier (US), Bunche's acting replacement for Special Representative, that Lumumba was erratic and not consulting with the Cabinet or Head-of-State. In Kasavubu's eyes, Lumumba

was a dictator.(25) Lumumba countered by "firing" Kasavubu. In an effort to calm the situation Cordier closed all airports and radio stations under UN control. This action was perceived as being pro-Kasavubu because Cordier's action has a greater impact on Lumumba and his supporters. Hammarskjold followed up with a report on 7 September 1960 that for civilian protection and prevention of genocide a "temporary disarming of military" (ANC) may be necessary.

MG Alexander had recommended disarming the ANC when he first arrived in the Congo. In fact some ANC units surrendered their arms to his units and later to ONUC troops. At that time the recommendation and action were opposed by Lumumba, Hammarskjold, Bunche, and Von Horn.

The Soviet Union and the Congolese Central Government objected to the disarming the ANC and Hammarskjold narrowed the requirement to soldiers that had "broken away from their command," "undisciplined actions," and where "authorities have lost control." (26) Compounding the confusion the Chamber of the Central Congolese Government, the lower house of Parliament, invalidated both Kasavubu's and Lumumba's dismissal. It established, on 8 September, a commission to resolve the differences. This action was followed by a questionable Parliament vote, 13 September, giving full power to Lumumba. This vote was taken with pro-Lumumba soldiers present and without a quorum. Due to this action Kasavubu responded by adjourning both houses, Chamber and Senate, for one month.(27) On 14 September ANC Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu lead a coup d'etat, dissolved the National Assembly, and expelled the Soviet ambassador. He established a College of Commissioners of returning graduates and students to take over the duties of the government. Mobutu declared that the Army was "neutralizing" the politicians, including Kasavubu, the two rival governments

of Lumumba and Ileo, and the Parliament until 31 December 1960. Mobutu's control over the ANC and government was not, however, absolute and Kasavubu and the Senate were able to carry on business. The Senate elects Joseph Ileo to replace Lumumba who was under ONUC protection in his residence. Attempts to arrest Lumumba by Kasavubu and Mobutu, were unsuccessful due to the intervention of Rajeshwar Dayal, Cordier's replacement, who refused to grant their requests. ONUC in his view would not function or act on behalf of one faction to the detriment of another. "Committed to the principle of neutrality and legality, ONUC could not choose between rival governments." (28) Failure to turn Lumumba over created pressure on Dayal and the UN from Mobutu, Kasavubu, ANC, and their supporting Western Powers.

The Central Congo Government was in disarray as the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations meets in New York. Lumumba, under ONUC protective security, remained the legal prime minister, Mobutu suspended the Kasavubu and the Ileo government which remained functioning, and all parties were at odds with the United Nations. The seating of the Congo delegation to the UN General Assembly increased tension and served to legitimize the faction that gains representation. US pressure on the Credential Committee and in the General Assembly caused the Kasavubu delegation to be seated on 24 November. (29). At the same time pro-Lumumba forces under former deputy prime minister Antoine Gizenga and General Victor Lundula seized control of Stanleyville and set up a pro-Lumumba government in Orientale province. Lumumba left the protective custody of the UN in an attempt to reach Stanleyville, but was captured and arrested by Mobutu's soldiers on 1 December 1960. Mobutu sent Lumumba and two of his followers to Elisabethville, Katanga on 17 January 1961 and

handed them over to Tshombe. Tshombe announced that all three were shot dead trying to escape on 13 February 1961.(30)

The death of Lumumba has immediate wide impact. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 4741 (S/4741) on 21 February which authorized the UN forces to use the appropriate measures to end the civil war to include the use of force. The resolution also called for the expulsion of mercenaries, but Tshombe actively disregarded the requirement. (The number of mercenaries actually increased in Katanga.) The Congolese National Assembly was to reconvene under UN protection. The resolution was not well received in Leopoldville by Kasavubu because he felt that S/4741 allowed ONUC to use force to disarm the ANC and reconvene Parliament. Kasavubu also saw this as an infringement on Congolese sovereignty.(31) The Secretary-General was held directly responsible for the assassination of Lumumba by the Soviet Union. This increased the already considerable pressure on Hammarskjold for ONUC's actions. World public feelings also ran hot as a riot occurred in the public gallery of the UN and the Belgian Embassy in Cairo was burned. ONUC's troop strength was also affected as Indonesia, Morocco, and the UAR (Egypt) withdrew their contingents from ONUC.(32). This troop short fall was overcome by additional forces from Tunisian and Indian governments. India became the major troop supporter for ONUC. On 25 March 1961 the USSR stated that would not pay for the Congo operation. France joined a few days later and other nations followed. ONUC costed approximately \$10 million per month and member nations' persistent refusal to pay for ONUC was to bring the UN close to bankruptcy. This financial crisis became a factor in the eventual withdrawal of ONUC.(33)

The death of Lumumba also colored Tshombe especially with the new American administration. The United States policy moved closer to the

"unity of Congo" position of the Afro-Asian countries and away from the Belgian-France-British Katanga position.(34) US support, both logistical and financial, was a political mainstay for the Secretary-General.

Better relations developed between the UN and Kasavubu through Hammarskjöld's efforts. On 17 April he agreed to carry out the Security Council resolutions and the UN reaffirmed the policy that Congo sovereignty would be respected by the implementation of the resolution.(35) This also coincided with a change in the Brussels government. As the Belgian government showed signs of cooperating with the UN, Tshombe started to depend more on mercenaries in his gendarmerie. Many of these new mercenaries came from the failed French Army coup in Algeria. Union Minière still continued to undermine ONUC efforts by paying high wages for mercenaries and purchasing military equipment to support them.(36)

In June and August ONUC was able to bring the Leopoldville and Stanleyville regimes together and to reconvene the Parliament. Under ONUC physical security and its good office, the National Assembly met at Lovanium University outside of Leopoldville. As a result Cyrille Adoula was elected prime minister and normal political administration was reestablished.(37) ONUC troop strength reached its peak during these meetings; 19,400 troops were in the Congo the end of July 1961. Due to this new political stability within the Central Government and increased military strength, ONUC was able to turn to the full implementation of the 21 February 1961 resolution regarding mercenaries.

The UN representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O'Brien, tried to have Tshombe meet with Adoula on 26 August to settle the Katanga issue with the new Central Government. O'Brien's efforts failed and planning began to enforce the 21 February resolution. On 28 August 1961 at 0400 hours ONUC

launched Operation RUM PUNCH in Katanga to round up and expel mercenaries. In the capital of Elisabethville 338 of 442 known European officers were captured (38) Tshombe yielded to ONUC demands for the expulsion of the mercenaries and gave a radio broadcast in support of ONUC's actions. The fruits of military and diplomatic effort were spoiled by the failure of the Belgium consul to expel the mercenaries, mostly Belgian, and Tshombe's subsequent reversal once out of ONUC's control.(39)

RUM PUNCH strengthened the Central Government, the USSR recognized the government on 1 September, and Afro-Asian countries had increased confidence in ONUC. However, besides failure to expel the mercenaries, RUM PUNCH created additional repercussions. The Europeans in Katanga and the Consulars in Elisabethville accused the UN of breaking up the "beautiful black-white friendship" that they enjoyed under Tshombe. In their view anti-Tshombe actions, like RUM PUNCH, were really anti-European because the Europeans supported Tshombe. This, in their view, placed the Europeans at grave risk in Katanga. The Rhodesian government agreed and took precautions along their border due to "high handed activities of the UN" that caused "concern among many Katangans." The Rhodesian government also stated that the British government would not support the seizing of Katanga by UN force.(40) The need to "safe guard" these Europeans spread ONUC's forces through out Katanga

A second intervention in support of the 21 February resolution was ordered for 0400 hours 13 September, Operation MORTHOR (also called ROUND ONE). MORTHOR was conducted without the knowledge of Hammarskjold who was enroute to the Congo. The urgency of the operation was due in part to the increasing propaganda on Katanga Radio that stated that the UN wanted to disarm the gendarmerie and introduce Central

Government forces into Katanga. The general belief was that objectives of RUM PUNCH could be easily recaptured by MORTHOR, and that Tshombe would again give into UN pressure. Tshombe, however, was not isolated by ONUC forces. He escaped to Rhodesia via the British Consul. ONUC forces encountered stiff resistance in their efforts to retake the radio station and post office. (ONUC was required to hand these buildings back over in the post-RUM PUNCH agreements.)(41) The dispersion of ONUC's forces directly impacted on the ability to carry out the operation. The forces were not strong enough to smash Tshombe's forces, and at the same time reinforce the besieged garrisons at Jadotville and Kamina. (42).

MORTHOR failure served to complicate an already difficult situation. The situation was further aggravated by arrest warrants for Tshombe and five others, issued by the Central Government and to be severed by ONUC as part of MORTHOR. This perception of collaboration and the use of force to end secession brought international condemnation on the UN.(43) Hammarskjold attempted to meet with Tshombe to gain a cease-fire. The UN Secretary-General and all on his aircraft were killed in an air crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, on 18 September. A provisional cease-fire was later signed on the 20th and Tshombe returned to Elisabethville.

The death of Hammarskjold dampened hope for a settlement in the Congo. To complete Hammarskjold remaining term U Thant was elected the acting Secretary-General. U Thant moved to restore ONUC's freedom of action in Katanga. The Security Council passed its strongest and most direct authorization for the use of force on 24 November. It also completely rejected Katanga's claim of a "sovereign independent nation."(44) What followed was ROUND TWO. This ONUC operation (also called Operation UROKAT) was conducted 14 to 21 December to improve ONUC freedom of

movement and control in Elisabethville and elsewhere in Katanga. Over 200 Katangese and foreigners were killed with the loss of twenty-five ONUC soldiers. Some considered this another failure because ROUND TWO did not end Katangan secession and the operation went beyond the use of force for self-defense.(45) ROUND TWO did end with the signing of the Kitona Accord by Tshombe. Tshombe agreed to recognize Kasavubu as head-of- state, to the authority of the Central Government, and to placement of the gendarmerie under the president. This agreement was, however, rejected by the Katanga cabinet and the deadlock and harassment of ONUC continued throughout 1962.(46)

Harassment of ONUC personnel was a continuous problem throughout the Congo operation. It occurred because of the environment, the poor training of the troops, and lack of guidance from ONUC. Early on, 18 August 1960, Canadian signallers were beaten up in Leopoldville. The ROE for self-defense was not clarified until March 1961 and then by the Canadian government and not the UN. ONUC never issued a directive to units on what level of force would be supported. Due to poor combat training and a lack of vigilance nine out of eleven men were killed in an Irish patrol along the Kivu and Katanga border in November 1960. The Irish believed that their blue armbands ensured their welcome. Thirteen Italian airmen from an ONUC aircraft were taken from the officer mess in Stanleyville shot and eaten by mutinous Congolese. The Malayan who were guarding the airfield did not expect such an incident. In March 1961 a Sudanese battalion was forced to surrender the port of Matadi after being out gunned, 37 mm artillery versus bren-guns, in flight with the ANC. On April 1961 a Ghanaian company at Port-Francqui made the "Irish mistake." They were overpowered by

"friendly" ANC troops, shot, and thrown into the river. There was little or no response to these incidents.(47)

The Katanga problem was finally solved during ROUND THREE (Operation JACARANDA) 27 December 1962 to 8 January 1963. Tshombe's gendarmerie which were increasing belligerent and out of control force the UN to act. After thirty-six hours of fighting ONUC controlled Elisabethville. Tshombe's forces were defeated by the Indian forces and driven out of Katanga. ONUC forces obtained the full freedom of movement through Katanga sought since 1960. U Thant's Plan for National Reconciliation was also implemented as a result of the success of ROUND THREE.(48)

With the ending of the Katanga succession U Thant planned the withdrawal of UN forces. The Congo Government, however, requested ONUC to remain and the General Assembly approved a short continuation.(49) As UN forces prepared to depart the Congo, U Thant felt that ONUC had largely fulfilled the UN mandates for protection of the Congo's political and territorial integrity, removal of foreign mercenaries, and prevention of civil war. The Secretary-General did acknowledge that internal security, law and order, need much improvement.(50) ONUC departed the Congo in June 1964.

Major Observations

Through four years of the Congo peacekeeping operation there were several pivotal concepts and persons that affected the conduct of ONUC. Two key ones are the UN mandate as defined by the resolutions, and the role of the Secretary-General as defined by Dag Hammarskjold. The UN resolutions set the stage for the operation not only as an agreement between the members of the Security Council, but as it defined the relationship between the Congo Central Government and its leaders with the UN's political and military leaders in the Congo and New York. The Secretary-General as the

executive agent of the Security Council is the lens through which the UN effort is focused. His view defines and shapes to a great degree the implementation of the mandate.

UN mandates are the authority for UN operations. The difficulty is to achieve consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council while avoiding a veto.(51) This leads to broadly written resolutions that seek to achieve consensus among the varied ideologies, interests, and points of view. The glossing over of points of contention or detailed guidance, such as use of force, may allow for passage of the resolution but generally causes difficulty later. Six resolutions were passed on the Congo in the UN, five in the Security Council and one in the General Assembly. (See Figure 1)

The Secretary-General used Article 99 of UN Charter to call the Security Council together which resulted in S/4387 on 14 July 1960.(52) This resolution deployed UN forces (ONUC) to the Congo. Its implementation displeased Lumumba because it failed to side with the Central Government in ending the Katanga secession. This placed UN forces at risk from threats and violence by the ANC. This tension will last through out the operation. Lumumba's call for the withdrawal of UN forces results in further UN debate and the passage of S/4405 on 22 July. S/4405 links "the maintenance of law and order within the Congo and the maintenance of international peace."(53) Additionally the combination of S/4387 and S/4405 place ONUC outside the unilateral approval of the Lumumba government. The effect is that the Security Council "legally" determines matters in the Congo while taking the Central Government's view into consideration.(54) Despite the efforts of the Secretary-General and his emissaries to solve the Katanga secession, these two resolutions accomplish little to solve the issue. Hammarskjold takes this

dilemma to the Security Council seeking clearer guidance. Resolution S/4426 mandates "that the entry of United Nations Forces into the province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution."(55) Tshombe believes that he can still put off the UN and the Secretary-General. Hammarskjold, however, informs Tshombe that the mandate is not negotiable and its "interpretation is the exclusive competence" of the UN, and furthermore the UN "does not conclude agreements with parties which are legally at fault in the situation."(56) As stated earlier, UN forces enter Katanga on 12 August with Hammarskjold leading the contingent. The turmoil that results in September 1960 is reflected in the deadlock and fruitless debate in the Security Council. A special emergency meeting of the General Assembly is called to overcome this deadlock. The result is passage of A/4510 on 20 September. A/4510 supports Hammarskjold's interpretation of the three preceding resolutions and the conduct of ONUC operations. Passage of A/4510 also results in personal attacks upon Hammarskjold and the position of the Secretary-General by the Soviet Union. Khrushchev calls for the resignation of Hammarskjold and the creation of a "troika" to replace the Secretary-General.(57)

Lumumba's death, the existence of four separate and conflicting factions in the Congo, and the Secretary-General's view that all current resolutions lack the enforcement power of Articles 41 and 42 leads to the passage of Security Council Resolution 4741 on 21 February 1961.(58) The new mandate gives Hammarskjold the authority to use force "if necessary, in the last resort."(See Annex A for full text of S/4741). This section is highly controversial as seen by subsequent actions and interpretations by various persons and governments.

"The new authority that the February 21 resolution provided for the use of force in the Congo was not accompanied by any substantial clarification of the circumstances in which force might be used, while withdrawals and threats of withdrawal from the Congo force has greatly weakened its military strength."(59)

In reality, Hammarskjold's interpretation of S/4741 and the actions of ONUC forces on the ground limited the use force and also caused problems. ONUC's operations RUM PUNCH and MORTIHOR (ROUND ONE) are examples.

The capstone resolution for the Congo was S/5002, but it still did not authorize force to end Katanga succession. The over arching principle of freedom of movement which was part of all ONUC's agreements since 29 July 1960 became the legal basis for ending the Katanga succession.(60) As in previous circumstance the interpretation of the Secretary-General is a key factor in all mandate issues.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold plays a leading role in ONUC and the formulation of peacekeeping policy. Hammarskjold sets the tempo for the operation from the start. This was then unexplored territory for the UN. In his view the Congo crisis was an opportunity to expand the positive role of the UN with in the current environment of the Cold War and to address threats to emerging Third World nations by the old colonial order. He was concerned about the development of Africa and has a personal fear that the Congo crisis could develop in to a type of "Spanish Civil War".(61) Hammarskjold also sees the role of the Secretary-General in a special way. His concept of shared responsibility is not one of shared decision making, but a "system of scrutiny by a parliamentary body of his decisions, actions, or interpretations, which would afford him protection against unjust criticism."(62)

He takes personal charge in putting ONUC together. From the 0325 hours passage of S/4387 on 14 July 1960 to 0630 hours, the Secretary-General and his small staff personnel start the operation; the requesting troops and transportation and naming the ONUC commander. Hammarskjöld desires an all African contingent but specialist skills require other nations. Sweden and Ireland are added to calm the fears of the white minority, especially in Katanga.(63) The chain of command flows from the Secretary-General to the Secretary-General Special Representative, Bunche, to the UN Force Commander, MG Von Horn. Military forces are to be consistently subordinate to civil control and direction. In addition to the resolution, there are some personal principles that guide Hammarskjöld and therefore ONUC.

The Secretary-General's actions follows three key principles. One, the United Nations forces and the conduct of the operations are autonomous. Although requested by the Congo government, ONUC is under exclusive UN control. ONUC control is under the Security Council but vested in the Secretary-General. Two, the UN is not to be part of the internal conflict in the Congo. ONUC is to follow a course of non-intervention in internal affairs. Three, UN forces follow the principle of the non use of force except for self-defense. This was established by Hammarskjöld in United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF-1) during the 1956 Suez Crisis. These principles are reflected in the manner in which Hammarskjöld performs his duties, the guidance he gives, and the reports he makes given. The basic principles for the operation are:

"The force might never use its weapons except in self-defense and might take no action that would make it party to internal conflicts. It was in the Congo to assist the Congolese government, at its request, and to restore and maintain order and law, the absence of which,

combined with the Belgian intervention, was a threat to international peace."(64)

This use of force is coupled with the principle legitimacy and impartiality which has a dramatic affect on the fragile political consensus both inside and outside the country. All parties feel free to give guidance to the Secretary-General, but he resists their attempts to influence him.

Hammaraskjold develops a small group of UN advisors to assist him informally. Those from the inner circle of the Secretariat that participated in these informal discussions become know as the "Congo Club." These advisors are informed of all the important dispatches coming from the Congo. This information is not always available to the General Assembly or Security Council. The inner circle of the "club" is mostly American. Subsequent pressure and the need to develop wider support results in the creation of the formal Congo Advisory Committee. The Committee is formed after the start of ONUC.(65) Hammaraskjold meets with the Congo Advisory Committee for the first time on 24 August 1960. These meetings provide for information flow among the involved parties and provides the Secretary-General a first hand means to hear the views of these countries.(66) Action, however, remains in the hands of the Secretary-General.

Section III. The Cohen and Gooch Model

Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch present their method to analysis failures in war in their book, Military Misfortunes. This book presents an organizational view of why failures occur. Their efforts go beyond the conventional traditional explanation of "the man in the dock," a collective way of thinking, military incompetence, institution or cultural failure. Their investigation lists three basic failures: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt. The combination of these three failures results in

catastrophes that can cause national collapse. In their analyzing failure they are guided by Clausewitz's concept of "Kritik," critical analysis.(67)

Clausewitz sees three different activities that are required for a critical approach. The three intellectual activities are: "discovery and interpretation of equivocal facts;" "tracing of effects back to their causes;" and, "investigation and evaluation of means employed."(68) The model that is developed is one of historical case study in which actions are systematically reviewed and analyzed at multiple levels. Cohen and Gooch use this mental approach to ground their method of study.

The Cohen and Gooch model consist of five steps:

1. What is the failure?
2. What were the critical tasks that went incomplete or unfulfilled?
3. Conduct a "layered analysis" of the different levels of the organization involved in the misfortune.
4. Construct an "analytical matrix" that presents the key problems graphically.
5. Derive the "pathways to misfortune" from the matrix.(69)

They develop their three basic failures by applying their five step method to five historical cases.(70) Their remedies for these failures are to learn, anticipate, and adapt.

Learning is linked to historical study and an ability for the organization to tread the middle road between slavish acceptance or unthinking rejection of the models presented. Anticipation as developed by Cohen and Gooch is more than just predicting enemy action, it includes comparing the enemy action with one's own way of war. To overcome this problem of anticipation many nations use doctrine. A failure in doctrine is likely to result in a failure to anticipate. Failure to adapt is linked directly to Clausewitz's

concept of chance and the opportunities that can be presented. To seize these opportunities the "conception of command" of the military organization must be part of the organizational makeup. "Some systems of command made adaptation to unexpected or unforeseen circumstances relatively easy, while others made it virtually impossible."(71)

The Cohen and Gooch approach is modified to examine the principles of OOTW as applied to ONUC. The question for step one is therefore modified from, "What is the failure?", to "Are the principles of OOTW required for peacekeeping operations supported by the historical events in ONUC?" The critical tasks for the analysis, step two of the Cohen and Gooch model, become the OOTW principles themselves: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. These terms are defined in Appendix A. Constructing step three, the "layered analysis" uses the various echelons involved in ONUC. The "layers" selected for analysis are: the UN and Security Council; the Secretary-General and his office; the Congolese; ONUC's civilian level; and, ONUC's military level. After the layered analysis of the critical tasks an analytical matrix will be constructed and conclusions drawn.

Of importance to this modified analysis is the relationship between failure to anticipate and doctrine. Anticipation as used by Cohen and Gooch goes beyond the issues of what the enemy will do. It addresses the issue of comparing the enemy to one's own way of making war. Failure here is rooted in pre-crisis thinking. Army institutional thinking is structured by doctrine. "Misfortunes of anticipation stem not just - and after not even chiefly - from failing to predict the specific actions of one's enemy, but from a failure to think through the sensitive issues of how well one's own forces can react to an opponent style of warfare."(72) Their approach also requires

a holistic approach in which doctrine incorporates politics, technology, as well as tactics into future war. The OOTW principles are setting the paradigm for future peacekeeping operations. They create conditions for shifts in the mindset of the institution. An analysis of these principles through an historical analysis is required to support this hypothesis. A brief paragraph on each principle precedes the analysis.(73)

IV Analysis

Objective. Objective is a principle of war that FM 100-5 applies to peace operations. It links all operations in an integrated effort toward the strategic aim. It requires an understanding by all leaders, military and political, of the strategic aim. Its end states are clearly defined and attainable. There is a symmetric relationship with the principle of unity of effort. The principle of objective was constantly violated in the Congo and especially so when considered in relationship with unity of effort.

The Security Council actions were greatly influenced by Cold War competition and the traditional colonial vestige of applying military force when there is a threat to individual national interests.(74) The Soviet Union support for S/4387 on 14 July 1960 is a vote in support of Lumumba (Cold War posturing). The abstention of France and the United Kingdom is a pro-Katanga view (colonial interests). But beyond this initial view of national interest or preference is an overarching issue of the UN mandate. The numerous competing interests of the members of the Security Council and other nations make it difficult and unrealistic for a clear or precise objective. As previously stated mandates (resolutions) by their very nature are vague. Although the initial consensus was united on the object of Belgian intervention, the ability to attain this objective was limited. The use of force was not authorized in the initial mandate. It would take eight months to

address the use of force to achieve the objective. The objective also changed with each resolution even though the general thrust remained the same, the removal of external forces or actors from the Congo. Security Council resolutions S/4387 and S/4405 focused on the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo; S/4426 addressed the particular problem of Belgian troops in Katanga and the requirement for UN forces to enter Katanga. The General Assembly resolution, A/4510, focused on the objectives of the three previous Security Council resolutions and adds the Secretary-General's assistance to the Congolese government for the maintenance and restoration of law and order. All military support to the Congo is through the UN via the Secretary-General. The death of Lumumba refined the objective in S/4741 to the prevention of civil war by the "use of force, if necessary, in the last resort," removal of mercenaries, convening of the Parliament, and the reorganization, discipline, and control of the ANC. The 24 November 1961 resolution, S/5002, rolled up the objectives of the UN and authorized the Secretary-General to use "a requisite measure of force" to accomplish the removal of the mercenaries.(75) In spite of the "agreed" objectives, there were those national interests that each country or bloc retained and pursued in the Congo. The pro-Lumumba support by the Communist bloc is mirrored by the pro-West support for Katanga. Third world support for the Congolese government is as much anti-colonial as it is pro-independence.

The Secretary-General crafts the resolutions to meet his long term objectives for the UN. The situation in the Congo offers an opportunity for the Hammarskjold led UN to become the broker for change and mediator between the two great super powers. This is particularly true in the emerging countries of Africa. To create this niche in the Cold War environment the Secretary-General applies his principles of impartiality,

objectivity, and use of force only for self-defense in crisis.(76)

"Peacekeeping" becomes a means to fulfill this role. Hammarskjold directs his efforts toward the accomplishment of the mandate in the manner that he feels is correct for the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, in his view, must retain his freedom of action. He does this through having his plan adopted by the General Assembly while retaining an understanding with the Afro-Asian nations that they would have a role in reconciling the parties in the Congo. To over rule the Secretary-General the Security Council must come to a consensus and that given the situation in the Congo was unlikely.(77) The objectives that the various resolutions lay out are accomplished in accordance with Hammarskjold's plan for impartiality and use of force. He moves the Secretariat toward these objectives and U Thant will continue the policy.

The basic objective of the Congolese is independence. The problem is the means of achieving independence and the degree of federation desired by the various tribal groups, parties, and provinces. Lumumba's MNC is at one pole while Tshombe, Katanga, and Kalonji, the Baluba Tribe of Kasai province, are on the other. Kasavubu position is between the extremes. There is no shared objective for these various factions. Woven through out the Congo issue are the Europeans, the Belgian administrators and white ANC leaders, whose objective is the continuation of the pre-independence system in a post-independence country.

UN political and military leaders in the Congo have the same objective, the fulfillment of the mandate. The difference is a question of degree. The UN political representatives, with a few notable exceptions, are also in synch with the additional objectives of the Secretary-General. Bunche and Dayal are closely in step with Hammarskjold. Although Khiary and O'Brien are in

line with the mandate objectives they appear out of step with Hammaraskjold's views especially on the use of force.

The ONUC military commanders military objective is to accomplish the mandate under the guidance provided. The implementation and the use of force are the points of contention. The early disarming of the ANC is overruled by Bunche and the force commander obeys. The principle of non-use of force and impartiality are followed to the detriment of the force. The military objective is not obtainable and causes initial failure for the multinational force. Military units support the UN chain of command. Units withdrawn are a result of a political decision by governments who no longer support the objectives of the operation. There is no evidence that shows that these troops failed to comply with UN direction while serving with ONUC. However, because of the clash between their government's national interests and UN objectives, these contingents did lose their credibility and had to be withdrawn.(78)

Unity of effort. Unity of effort is the adaptation of the principle of war unity of command. Unity of effort is the recognition that in OOTW the military command structure must be adjusted to consider the interests and efforts of other non-military participants. It is the wide range of government agencies, international agencies, private organization and non-governmental agencies that require the commander to seek cooperation and consensus in order to achieve unity of effort. Authority for the military commander maybe loosely defined while the requirements for understanding of military-civilian relationship dramatical increase. The US military may conduct peace operations under three possible arrangement: unilateral, lead nation, and supporting role.(79) Unity of effort in this non-military structure requires that the parties involved move in a spirit of

cooperation toward the specified objective. Unity of effort in ONUC was difficult to achieve at all times due to many of the difficulties discussed in the principle of objective.

Unity of effort at the Security Council level reflects the multinational support for a declared objective. The general initial agreement seems to reflect the belief that the individual national positions of the Permanent Five would be served by supporting the initial resolution or at a minimum not worth the political capital to oppose. Much is made of the Soviet support due to their connection to Lumumba. Lumumba's death undercut the Soviet position resulting in their refusal to financially support ONUC. French and British support waivers and proves to be an impediment over time. Their abstention on the resolutions, support to nations that cause difficulty for ONUC and the Secretary-General (French support for Belgian; British support for Rhodesia), French refusal to financially support ONUC, and British pressure on Hammarskjold after MORTHOR reflect a divisive effort. This is off set by the growth of US support, the general stable support of the Afro-Asian nations, and the military backing from India. US political support to ONUC is "one of the greatest contribution" to UN peacekeeping operations.(80)

The Secretary-General sought unity of effort through the structure of ONUC. ONUC is structured by a division of effort. Military elements were directed toward maintaining law and order and the civilian technical assistance program established government functions. ONUC technical assistance program was the UN's largest to date. Hammarskjold's hope was that the two elements would become integrated and complement each other.(81) ONUC was to be a combined effort "in which political, military, and technical assistance aspects would all be welded into an integrated

organization."(82) The operation is centrally controlled by the Secretary-General through his civilian representatives in the Congo. The Secretary-General makes a concerted effort to have all activities of the Congo controlled through his office. Hammarskjold's relationship and dealings with the Security Council also reflects his sense of the Secretary-General's position. He is the driving force behind ONUC from inception to his death and, as such, did much to focus and shape the operation. His decided view against the use of force can be seen as a limiting factor against the backdrop of the changing nature of the operation: increasing trend toward use of force by the Security Council and reduced cooperation by the Central Congolese government. Hammarskjold's actions, however, reflect the concept that peacekeeping operations are not the sole mean to resolve conflicts. It requires the complementary actions of peacemaking and peacebuilding.(83) Part of the approach to current peacekeeping still reflects Hammarskjold's restraint on force. "Armed force is not a means of achieving the solution. Armed force can only be used in self-defense and protection of UN property against attack, or as a last resort in carrying out the Force mandate."(84)

The absence of unity of effort on the part of the Central Congolese government has two themes. The first one is the civil war that developed in the Congo as three provinces attempt to secede. The second divisive theme is the vying for power within the Central government. It is only over time that some semblance of political unity, with UN support, is reestablished. These numerous factions directly affect the relationship of the Congo government to the UN and ONUC. The unwillingness of the UN to fulfill the expectation of the initial request for assistance, results in the Lumumba government being at odds with the furnished UN support. Intervention by the UN is rejected by the host country. ONUC's effort continues because the

resolution reflects an international concern of a threat to international peace. ONUC's impartiality in the operation, although in line with the Secretary-General's concept, is at variance with the perceptions of Lumumba and later Kasavubu. Tshombe efforts are united in opposition not only to the Central government but to ONUC efforts. His strength is directly related to the weakness of the Central Government and the ANC, the support of outside powers and economic interests, passive and active, and the constraints and restraint on ONUC's forces.

ONUC's civilian unity of effort is generally good. In large part this is due to the personal selection of the UN representatives in the Congo and Katanga by the Secretary-General. There is a personal connection. The major break down under Hammarskjold occurs with Operation MORTHOR. O'Brien and Hammarskjold do not have a close personnel relationship. Various sources claim that the break down occurred between O'Brien, the UN Katanga Representative, and Mahmoud Khiary, Chief UN Civilian Operations in the Congo. Khiary had given O'Brien the authority for RUM PUNCH. O'Brien holds that Khiary also authorized MORTHOR.(85) Regardless, the world media impression is that UN forces are acting in Katanga at the request of the Central Congolese Government and to end the secession of Katanga.(86) This is a serious breach to the unity of effort that Hammarskjold sought to achieve through his office and representatives. The "independent" operation is also more damaging because it failed.

Unity of effort in the ONUC forces are less than acceptable. ONUC is plagued with numerous problems that affects its ability to operate in a united manner. The effort is multinational with varying quality of officers, specialized units, and troops. The political orientation of some troops also influence their effectiveness.(87) The ability to successfully accomplish

ROUND THREE is a result of the use of mostly Indian troops, a forerunner of the "lead nations" concept, and US transportation support.

Legitimacy. The legitimacy of peacekeeping operations in accordance with FM 100-5 is a function of perceptions. The force is perceived to be functioning within the standards that constitute a genuine right of the host government or a recognized agency. The peacekeeping force is not to undercut the legitimacy of the host government by performing acts that detract from the host government. Impartiality is critical to success and must be demonstrated at all times. In the absence of a legitimate government, operations must be conducted in such a manner that the peacekeeping force does not inadvertently legitimize one faction while alienating another.

The series of resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly are the foundation for the legitimacy of ONUC. The passage of these resolutions empowered the Secretary-General to act on behalf of the UN and the world body. No direct opposition is mounted against these actions in the United Nations. Although legitimate, the abstention vote by some countries (see Figure 1), the subsequent diplomatic pressure, and funding refusals question the depth of support for the resolutions.

Both Hammarskjold and U Thant show great concern for legitimacy in the operation. The General Assembly's vote on 20 September supports Hammarskjold's actions and is seen as a vote of confidence.(88) This is important because this vote takes place after Hammarskjold overrules Lumumba's call for the withdrawal of UN forces. Even after the 21 February resolution, S/4741, which authorizes the use of force Hammarskjold does not resort to force. The final confrontation under U Thant is supported not only by the mandate but by the agreement on "Freedom of movement" signed in

July 1960. This concept, agreed to by the Government of the Congo, is the legal basis for the final operation in Katanga. The difference between Hammarskjold and U Thant is their view on the use of force and willingness to use it.(89)

Legitimacy for the Government of the Congo is more complex. The failure of the Central Congolese Government to control the ANC, the tribal warfare, and the crisis of September between Kasavubu, Lumumba, and eventually Mobutu, all cloud the issue. Central Congolese Government legitimacy is due to UN efforts. The seating of Kasavubu in the UN, continued support through UN resolutions and the Secretary-General for a solution, continued ONUC efforts and support such as in the Parliament elections of July and August 1961, and ONUC's operations RUM PUNCH to ROUND THREE, result in a united Congo. The chronic problem remained a weak Central government and an ANC incapable of performing the required security tasks. Until peace building was accomplished these remained the problems.

ONUC civilian efforts mirror those of the Secretary-General. The great exception is MORTHOR. There are two schools of thought on this operation. One school is that MORTHOR was within the spirit of the 21 February resolution. The real failure was that it did not succeed. This view recognizes the fact that Hammarskjold's interpretation on the use of force was more restrictive than required. In fact conditions in the Congo changed with the death of Lumumba, the open opposition of Tshombe, and continued attacks on ONUC personnel. Hammarskjold failed to adjust to the new environment and demands. The other school follows a stricter line of reasoning. The interpretation of the Secretary-General was the correct one to follow. Failure to do so was contrary to the mandate given ONUC by the UN and implemented and interpreted by the Secretary-General. As a minimum the

perception is that MORTHOR exceeded the authority of the mandate and the guidance of the Secretary-General.

ONUC's forces acted within the guidance provided. They responded to the requirements placed upon them by their civilian higher headquarters. Operation MORTHOR was conducted under the understanding that it was authorized. The only example of when military operations exceeded the authorization of civilian authority is in ROUND THREE. Brigadier R.S. Naranha forced his way across the Lufira River near Jadotville due to military necessity. His action was supported later by U Thant.(90) The Status of Forces Agreement between the UN and the Congo is another issue. The legalizing of the UN force's status took over a year to negotiate. This agreement is important because it validates the operational and legal rights of ONUC's forces. The rapid deployment of forces, the early problems between Lumumba's government and the UN, and the general chaos all added to the difficulty of the situation and the relationship of ONUC's forces to the Congolese government. The legality of ONUC is therefore seen differently by the Congo government and the UN. UN forces did act under the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the 1948 Geneva Convention.(91)

Perseverance. Protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aim is perseverance. It does not preclude decisive military action, but places the results of such action in an analysis of the desired long term end state and strategic objectives. The commander is asked to balance the desire for quick near term objective accomplishment against the operation restraints and the strategic aims. Because this principle requires patience and the willingness to amend traditional measures of success it can also impact on the forces approach to the principle of restraint. Operation length

may be short or long because the underlying cause of the crisis is normally unclear or very complex.

The Congo operation is not initially seen as a long term operation by the UN. The cost in soldiers, money, time, political status, and lives exceeded the initial assessment. The reality is that over time the objectives changed, support changed, unity of effort changed, and with these changes the commitment in nations of the Security Council and UN changed. Over time the resolutions reflect a greater willingness to use force to solve the problem of Katanga succession and foreign military presence. The withdrawal of financial support by the Soviet Union, France, and others shows a lack of willingness to support the long term conflict resolution. The growing US support, the political willingness of several Afro-Asian nations, and the military commitment of several nations, especially India, provides the long term support. With the general exception of the Afro-Asian nations, the willingness to support the operation reflects the waxing and waning of national interests and changes in the world environment. For examples, the China-Indian border war and the resulting projected Indian troop loss to ONUC are considered by U Thant in ROUND THREE.

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld efforts show great commitment to his concept of peace, peacekeeping, the role of the UN, and the use of force. His dedication and that of his representatives to these principles provides a long term approach not only for the Congo but to the question of what the role of the UN and Secretary-General should be in this new environment of Cold War peacekeeping. The unwillingness to use force to solve the near term problem of Katanga, the adherence to self-defense only, the requirement for the Secretary-General to have freedom of action, and the need for an impartial approach to the internal problems of the Congo are clear signs of

the commitment to Hammarskjold's vision. The difficulty with this type of personal perseverance is that it fails to adjust to the changing nature of the crisis. The application of these principles in a situation of increasing and extreme violence appear as a contradiction. Hammarskjold, however, has a firm belief of his role, liken to Sun Tzu, and a clear understanding of the future contradiction and misinterpretation that the Congo will bring. "A firm group of basic principles, and a determination to stick to them, would be best - perhaps the only - hope of ultimate success."(92)

The heart of the Congo crisis was the Congolese absence or abundance, depending on time, place , and leader, of perseverance to their own objectives. The turmoil and chaos of the various political factions mixed with tribal animosity and external support acted as gasoline on an open flame. Short term solutions to gain advantage and support were common. The overriding theme of perseverance for the Congolese appears to be the Machiavellian approach to personal power. Kasavubu is given credit by some for his ability to use ONUC to support his personal career. ONUC was denied an active role in areas under ANC control but used in Kasai, Orientale, and Katanga where his forces were less effective. (93)

The actions of the ONUC special representatives mirror the determination of the Secretary-General. Bunche's countermanding the order to disarm the ANC and his efforts to negotiate ONUC entry into Katanga reflect the effort to use peaceful means and to avoid interfering with the internal operations of the Congo. Dayal's refusal to release Lumumba to Mobutu and the ANC supports the rule of impartiality. This persistence and spirited adherence to the Secretary-General's vision is off set by having six Special Representatives between July 1960 to February 1962. The Katangne representative changes seven times. The operations RUM PUNCH and MORTHOR are not do to a lack

of persistence but to a different interpretations. Operation ROUND THREE is conducted after all other means have been applied and justified under freedom of movement and self-defense.

The ONUC force show remarkable effort to continue their duties despite all the operational problems. The effect on the force in the field is more a result of their governments unwillingness to continue support. These contingents are withdrawn. What does affect the forces is a lack of professional capability in the multi-national structure. The quality of the troops vary in the battalions, well trained and supported in the battalions from Ghana and Nigeria to inadequately trained and supported in the units from Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, Mali, Liberia, and Guinea. The Swedish and Irish units were ill prepared for the tasks they had to perform.(94) The contribution of India both in troops and commanders was the most deciding factor. In the critical time from May 1961 to March 1963 they comprised one-fourth to one-third of ONUC's forces. The commanders for all three major operations in Katanga were Indian generals.

Restraint. Restraint is closely linked to the principle of legitimacy. The principle of restraint for the force and soldiers is expressed in the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Peace operations will result in a more restrictive ROE that limits the the level of politically supportable and acceptable violence. This ROE is subject to change during the course of the operation. The use of force for self-defense only is a normal restriction for peacekeeping operations. Use of force must be controlled and fully justified and as such must support of be in consort with the principle of legitimacy as defined by the operation. Alternatives to force should be explored and exhausted. Such measures are mediation and negotiation for the parties involved which can include the peacekeeping force itself. Force is the last resort. The actions of

the force are framed by the ROE; it effects their concept of initiative and self-defense.

The Security Council's approach to restraint was through the various resolutions. Although "use of force" was part of the 21 February and 24 November resolutions, the mandate did not formally use Article 39, 41, or 42 of the UN Charter. The resolutions therefore are not "enforcement measures." The Security Council really set the conditions for this principle by charging the Secretary-General with implementation of the mandate. However, as the Security Council seeks to loosen this restraint they appear less able to do so. The Congo is the only time the Security Council voted to end a civil war.(95) The actions of the Security Council also reflect the need for consensus prior to action to prevent a deadlock as happen in September 1960.

As already seen Hammarskjold adherence to selected principles acted as a restraint. His personal commitment to the UN Charter and non-use of force were transmitted to his representatives and military commanders in the field. Hammarskjold preference was always for the diplomatic approach. When information on the mercenary recruitment system he was found in April 1961, he uses a personal approach to the countries concerned to close down the centers.(96) Hammarskjold's death did not reduce the diplomatic approach, even though U Thant was less opposed to the use of force. In general after Hammarskjold's death there was a departure from the rigorous support of the UN Charter (97)

Restraint within the Congo was absent among all parties. The problem was really a lack of control to impose restraint. This lack of control is most apparent in the ANC. The inability to control the ANC and work with ONUC was a major problem that has post-ONUC results. Even Tshombe required

European or mercenaries to control his gendarmerie. His loss of restraint sets up the conditions for ROUND THREE.

The UN special representatives showed restraint as directed by New York. Their restraint was however interpreted by one Congolese faction as support for the other. This type of restraint added to the uncertainty of the situation and to a large degree the chance to achieve the end state. ONUC would eventual withdrawal and transfer the UN operation to some local authorities. The failure to aggressively pursue the role of military assistance from the first resolution undercut the ability of the UN to transfer ONUC's mission at a later date. The inability of ONUC and the Congolese to build a more loyal and effective ANC was a major short fall. Their failure to ensure that ROE especially on the issue of self-defense was well understood added to the perception of weakness.

The greatest impact was felt at the troop level. The complexity of the Congo operation has been called "enforced peacekeeping" or "Chapter VI 1/2." (98) The restraint placed on the force was compounded by the poor training and quality of some of the force. Well trained units, Indian and Nigerian, had less difficulty under the "self-defense" only rule. Most apparent was the lack of understanding about "self-defense." Failure to understand that ROE lead to some ONUC forces surrendering their arms. This leads to a perception of weakness. However, when force was applied ONUC did it prudently. ONUC forces did adhere to what has developed into an important aspect of ROE: ONUC showed all sides that they did not wish to use force, but if required it would be a matter of "no choice" and not done out of hostility or anger. (99)

Security. The principle of security is principally force protection. They are actions taken to counter actions that could harm the units of jeopardize

the mission. To a large degree it is a mindset that prevents the force from being lulled into a sense of security because of the non-hostile intent of the mission. In security it is understood that any person, element, or group could perform a hostile act against the force. Security is a counter to the risk the force may face. Conduct that develops the perceptions that the force is impartial, legitimate, and credible, enhances the physical measures to protect the force. The ability to rapidly transition from peacekeeping to combat is an inherent responsibility. The concept of force protection may extend the force to civil agencies, non-governmental offices, or civil and humanitarian projects. Although peace operations may preclude some force protection techniques, e.g. camouflage, the right of self-defense always applies.

As already seen the Security Council resolutions developed over time, but they initially placed UN forces in a difficult situation that grew more complex and dangerous. Changing national interests, the need for consensus to act, and the changing variables of consent, violence, and perceived impartiality affect the security of ONUC.(100) Additionally the lack of funding, logistical support, troop withdrawal, and in some cases sly opposition, degraded the security. Some of the complexities are a natural result of a multi-national/combine operations being conducted in the gray area of the cold war peacekeeping.

Although both Secretary-Generals held to the issue of self-defense only, they did seek to protect the force through following their own guidelines. Hammarskjold clearly believed that his independent position and focus on impartiality, legitimate, and non-use of force provided a level of protection for ONUC. It is the dealing with various changes that a gap appears. They also extended their concept of security to those outside ONUC. If under UN

control, like Lumumba, the UN would protect, self-defense, if attacked. U Thant used this line of reasoning for ROUND THREE when ONUC's forces were attacked and their freedom of movement threaten in Katanga.

The Congolese are clearly able to exploit the weakness of their opposition and ONUC. All Congolese leaders understood that the environment in Congo is hostile and a struggle not only for their objectives but in some cases for their very lives. They are clearly aware that they are on the higher side of the conflict scale and therefore take action to protect themselves. The Central government is most at fault because of their reluctance to deal with ONUC in training the ANC. An untrained ANC undermines the ability of the government to provide the necessary security. They understand this after time and money has run out for ONUC.

The action by ONUC's civilian leadership paralleled that of New York. Dayal's action for Lumumba's protection clearly supports Hammarskjold's views. Once outside ONUC's protection, Lumumba could count only on UN political action. The actions of O'Brien and Khiary are, however, unsupportable. Their action in MORTHOR not only exceeded the mandate and the guiding principles, but placed the security of ONUC at great risk by following the pattern of RUM PUNCH. Tshombe has acquired an unexpected advantage. The justification for ROUND THREE which ends the Katanga secession is rationalized by U Thant and ONUC. The attack by gendarmerie on ONUC positions make "it possible for ONUC to invoke the right of self-defense" and freedom of movement.(101) It is the more liberal interpretation of these rights that is unexpected by Tshombe and therefore provides greater security for the force.

Security, the protection of the force, is a clear problem for most ONUC units. The lack of clear understanding of the right of self-defense, the poor

combat skills of the force, the lack of an understanding of the hostile environment in which they operated in cost lives. The deaths of the Ghanaian and Irish soldiers are the grimmest supporting facts. It also affects the perception of ONUC's credibility, it is a weakness that the various factions use. The numerous problems of a multi-national organization, lack of preparation and planning, poor support structure, dispersed forces over great distances, only compounded the security problem. Although not set up for failure, they were not supported for success. It is also clear that some security measures, such as disarming the ANC, were political unsupportable. Security for ONUC was intimately involved with the combat readiness of the units and the political environment of the operation.

Having described the support each OOTW principle received at each layer the analytical matrix is constructed and presented.(See Figure 2) An additional adaptation is added to the matrix to assist in analysis. The amount of support that each layer provides to the OOTW principle is given a subjective weighted value. The scale of value is from -2 to +2 with the following criteria: -2, very weak or none; -1, weak; 0, neutral; +1, some; +2, strong support. It is a subjective evaluation based upon the overall support for the total duration of ONUC. The purpose is to highlight patterns. (See Figure 2A.)

V Conclusion

This review and analysis of ONUC reinforces the observation that this was a complex, difficult, and controversial operation. Its "success" is subject to the individual criteria use and emphasis placed on its various results or lack of results. The evaluation of how much support the OOTW principles provided ONUC is likewise a subjective evaluation by the author. There are

two parts to this conclusion: the support for the OOTW principles in ONUC, and some considerations for future peacekeeping operations.

As in war all the principles of OOTW were not equally important. The Cohen and Gooch method brings out the dynamic relationship of the principles to each other, and the dynamic effect the layers have on the principles. A weakness or strength at one layer can be negated at another.

The more critical principles in ONUC were objective, legitimacy, and restraint. Although not all the objectives proved attainable, it is clear that the mandate tried to more clearly define the objectives and be flexible and decisive as events changed. However, complexity increased with each resolution. Unique to ONUC was the vision that the Secretary-Generals imposed on the operation. Their objectives decided the road for achievement of the end state more than the written mandates. The consistent objectives of Belgium troop withdrawal, the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, and removal of mercenaries were accomplished. Legitimacy while more complex was also consistently supported. Despite the withdrawal of consent by the Central Congolese government and Soviet and French support, ONUC continued. The Secretary-General used the "threat to international peace" to legitimize the UN actions. This interpretation was accepted and supported. This thus became the underlying theme of legitimacy for the majority of member nations regardless of the real threat. Restraint is supported in ONUC but it is driven by political principle versus prudent and appropriate military capability. Non use of force is so prominent that it affects the interpretation of self-defense, limits the response as situations change, and gives the impression of weakness. But peacekeeping operations are in support of diplomatic efforts

and ONUC shows a great dedication to this concept. The prime mover of this concept is Hammarskjold.

The less supported principles were unity of effort, perseverance, and security. Although consensus is achieved for mandate passage, it is clear that unity of effort within the Security Council is absent. It is more than a cold war issue as seen by the actions of France and Britain. The absence of unity of effort affects perseverance, generates challenges to the role of the Secretary-General, and ultimately places ONUC and the UN in a financial crisis. Paradoxical this is offset by a combination of three factors. Even though FM 100-5 states that unity of effort is an adaptation of unity of command, it is unity of command under the Hammarskjold that gives the drive and purpose to ONUC. He focuses the effort of his organization to accomplish the mission. The military support of India, and US political and financial support greatly assist in the accomplishment of that mission.

Although this unity of effort was sufficient to achieve some of the objectives and maintain general political support in the General Assembly, its lack of depth and duration affects ONUC's overall perseverance. The length of time, the series of actions and reactions, change in national interests, and the changing world environment, decreased the willingness to stay the course. The death of Hammarskjold, the impending loss of Indian troops, due to the China-India border conflict, and financial cost severely undercut perseverance. ONUC clearly points out that perseverance has a dollar and time element that must be considered.


Security is the weakest principle. With out question the political objectives took precedence over military efficiency in ONUC. The lack of unity of effort placed ONUC's forces at greater risk than required. The steadfast position of impartiality, non use of force, and confusion over the

right of self-defence degraded security. The greatest impact on security was, however, the mindset and quality of the troops. The lack of combat proficiency by the troops increases their risks and the risk to the overall operation.

This analysis of the OOTW principles and the Congo operation also provides some overall consideration for future peacekeeping. The OOTW principles are not preconditions for peacekeeping. The relevance and weight of each principle will change during the duration of the operation. Unity of command, even under civilian leadership, is just as important as unity of effort. The degree of consent and support of the host country is subject to change especially if impartiality is not congruent with the host governments perceptions. Security is a function of the mindset and combat capability of the troops. The perception of combat effectiveness is vital to the credibility of the force. Perseverance is not only a function of military capability but an appreciation and understanding that the political objective is more important than the military objectives, and that time and money affect the amount of perseverance available. Although FM 100-5 states that the principles of war apply in OOTW where direct combat is involved, the dividing line between OOTW and war is not clear. Reliance on the OOTW principles alone may move one toward a failure to anticipate. ONUC highlights the difficulty of any future Chapter 6 1/2 operation which has this seamless transition from "peace" to "war". Although these are operations in which the level of conflict at certain times and places equal war, the use of force is still evaluated in political not military efficiency. ONUC strongly points out the need to include those considerations for combined operations. Peacekeeping operations are multi-national.(102) This is an area of emphasis that is currently lacking in FM 100-5 OOTW discussion. What is also clear is that

this is not just a horizon issue, but also a vertical issue. The military commander or planner who applies any principle or consideration only at his level, horizontal, and fails to check the support for that principle through out the organization, vertically, is taking a risk. Failure to review and adjust or add to these OOTW principles during the duration of the peacekeeping operation is a gamble.

MAP REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.*



REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
The Six Provinces as of July, 1960

* From Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1965) inside cover.

Figure 1

<u>Resolution**</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Vote</u>
S/4387	14 July 1960	8 to 0; 3 abstentions: China (Taiwan), France, and United Kingdom.
S/4405	22 July 1960	Unanimous
S/4426	9 August 1960	9 to 0; 2 abstentions: France and Italy.
A/4510	20 September 1960	70 to 0; 11 abstentions, one absent, Bolivia.
S/4741	21 February 1961	9 to 0; 2 abstentions: France and Soviet Union.
S/5002	24 November 1961	9 to 0; 2 abstentions: France and United Kingdom.

**S- Security Council

A- General Assembly

Figure 2.

Critical tasks:

Level

UN/Security Council.

Initially good, remove Belgian. Over time more added and less sustainable. +1

Poor to very poor. Only off set by growing US support. -2

Legally correct but not fully supported beyond the "paper". +1

Very low especially if viewed in financial terms. Off set by US and India. -1

Secretary-General.

Very clear for role of UN and S-G. The S-G's objectives takes precedents over UN/SC. +2

Focused effort, driven by the Secretary-General. +2

Actions taken in line with UN approval. Great effort at impartiality and non-use of force. +2

Good support but unable to effect later changes when required. +1

Good support but restrictive when adhered to in face of changing considerations. 0

Congolese.

No common objective-multiple and exclusive objectives. -1

Strong effort for independence but also for individual objectives Overall chaos. -2

Complex and varied; depending on the faction and time. -2

Outstanding for faction's goals and detrimental to ONUC. -2

In general broken through out country and for most of operation. -1

Focused totally inward on the factions. -2

ONUG Civilian.

Generally clear and defined; LAW the Secretary-General. +1

Over all very good but falls at critical moment (MORTHOR). 0

With the exception of MORTHOR in line with the S-G and SC. +1

Strong determination to follow through for the long term. +1

Poor, although in line with S-G. Failed to address ROE and changing conditions on the ground. 0

Consistence but weak. Ultimately affects credibility. 0

ONUG Military.

Clear but difficult to obtain. +1

General poor because of organization and resources. India critical to overall success. +1

Legal from authority granted and conduct, but not accepted by factions in Congo. +1

Poor and changing military capability offset by lead nation concept - India. 0

Good, but undercut by quality of units and understanding of ROE. +1

Poor due to external factor and aggravated by poor unit combat skills. 0

Figure 2A

Critical Tasks ----- Level	Objective	Unity of Effort	Legitimacy	Persuance	Restraint	Security
UN/Security Council	+1	-2	+1	-1	+1	-1
Secretary- General	+2	+2	+2	+1	+1	0
Congolese	-1	-2	-2	-2	-1	-2
ONUC: Civilian	+1	0	+1	+1	0	0
ONUC: Military	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0

Appendix A. Definitions.

The following terms are defined in FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1993) pages 13-3 to 13-4.

Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort toward every objective.

Legitimacy: Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

Security: Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

ENDNOTES

1. David Wurmser and Nancy Berg Dyke, The Professionalization of Peacekeeping, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 12-14. The Congo operation is cited by some authorities as Chapter 6 & 1/2 because it falls between Chapter 6 (peacekeeping) and Chapter 7 (enforcement) of the UN Charter. See also John F. Hillen, III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a half," Parameters (Spring 1994): 27-37.
2. Elliot A. Cohen, and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: The Free Press, 1990).
3. Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 232. General background on ONUC is from the following sources: William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1965); Anthony Verrier International Peacekeeping, (New York: Penguin Books, 1982); and, Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge.
4. Verrier, 43, and A.G. Mezerik, Congo and the United Nations, 3 (New York: International Review Service, 1963), 32.
5. Lefever, 8.
6. Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission For Hammarskjold, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 317; and, Colin Legum, Congo Disaster, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), 111-113. Numbers of Congolese in the Force Publique in 1960 vary between 23,000 to 25,000. European Officers numbered 1,000 to 1,100. Lefever, 10.
7. Verrier, 49.
8. Lefever, 10.
9. Verrier, 49.
10. Legum, 94.
11. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), 389.

12. Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, 72; Lefever, 11; and, Verrier, 50. Verrier states that "long-service senior NCOs saw their fellow Congolese elevated to rank of minister and the like while they remained as before." Mutiny started in Leopoldville, Thysville, and spreads.

13. Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 73.

14. Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, 72-73; and, Durch, 318.

15. George Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operations in the Congo 1960 - 1964 (International Crisis and the Role of Law), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 21-23; and Yearbook of the United Nations-1960, (New York: Dept. of Public Information, United Nations, 1962), 56.

16. Lefever, 14. Khrushchev replied that Moscow was prepared to provide "any assistance that might be necessary." See Verrier, 60 on Ghanaia.

17. Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, 73-74; and Lefever, 190. Lefever, Appendix B, 190-197, covers the text of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the Congo. See Verrier, 60, on Ghanaia.

18. Rikhye, Harbottle, and, Egge, 76; Durch, 337-338; Dayal, 23, 131. "He (Von Horn) was constantly engaged in a petty vendetta with Ralph Bunche." Dayal, 23.

19. Abi-Saab, 24-25, and Urquhart, 408. Belgian soldiers had disarmed the Congolese Army (ANC) that were loyal to the Central Government in Katanga.

20. Legum, 133.

21. Abi-Saab, 30-31.

22. Urquhart, 408-409.

23. Belgian maintained order in Katanga until their official departure in September 1960. After departure 114 Belgian officers were seconded in gendarmerie. Lefever, 29. See also Abi-Saab, 41.

24. Massacre in a mission school included seventy men, women, and children. Incident caused Hammarskjold to confront the Soviets on the issue of bilateral aid. Abi-Saab, 54-55.

25. Dayal, 29

26. The action had the additional advantage of focusing on ANC elements that were really outlaws and allowed the Central Government a way out of the current situation. Abi-Saab, 57-58. Alexander's other recommendations were to restore law and order, and to retrain the ANC. Verrier, 60.

27. Abi-Saab, 75-76.

28. Year Book of the United Nations - 1961, 68. Dayal also considered the warrant illegal because Lumumba as a member of Parliament enjoyed immunity until warred by Parliament. Abi-Sabb, 78. Lumumba residence was guarded by UN troops but "encircled by Congolese troops." Year Book UN - 1960, 72.

29. Vote to seat the Kasavubu delegation was 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions. Abi-Saab, 60-88.

30. The death of Lumumba and his two followers has never been totally cleared up. His assassination was due impart to fears that the Kennedy Administration would favor national reconciliation, and an increase in pro-Lumumba support in the ANC. Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, 77-78. See also Abi-Saab, 98-99.

31. Abi-Saab, 107.

32. Urquhart, 501-502, and 506-507.

33. Ibid, 512-514. By January 1963 the UN Congo fund was \$76.2 million in arrears of which the Soviet Union owed \$32 million. Mezerik, 21-28. The 19th Regular Session of the General Assembly met to address a net deficit of \$134 million. Year Book UN - 1964, 3-59.

34. Tshombe's position was also weaker with the Belgian government. A rapprochement between the Belgians and the Leopoldville leaders occurred after the fall of Lumumba. O'Brien, 96-99.

35. Abi-Saab, 111.

36. Urquhart, 516, 547, and 550-551. Taxes and royalties for Tshombe were \$52 million in 1961. Year Book UN - 1961, 61. Sales of the Company

which was largely Belgium and British owned were \$200 million a year. Mezerik, 32-33..

37. Urquhart, 531, and Rikyhe, Hartbottle, and Egge, 79.

38. O'Brien added extra precautions to RUM PUNCH to prevent resistance by Tshombe's forces. These additional measures were the temporary detention of the Katanga Minister of Interior, Godefroid Mumongo, the strong man behind Tshombe, and the temporary occupation of the radio and post office (it housed the telephone exchange). O'Brien also met with Tshombe to inform him of the operation and its objectives. Mumongo appears to be a "dark figure" in the Tshombe government. A UN Commission of Inquiry on Lumumba's murder found Mumongo guilty of Lumumba's death. He was also linked to terrorist act against UN personnel. O'Brien, 73 and 233-235.

39. O'Brien, 215-218; and Rikhye, Hartbottle, and Egge, 79. Action was also supported by the passage of Ordinance 70 by the Central Government which called for all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries in the Congo to be expelled. Action by the Central Government may have been in response to the arrest of Raphael Bintou by Mumongo in Elisabethville on 23 August 1961. O'Brien, 209-212.

40. O'Brien, 220-222, and 228-230. In responding to the safety of the European population UN forces were spread out. An Irish company was sent to protect Europeans in Jakotville as part of this measure. This Company was later forced to surrender and was held captive for five weeks. Sir Roy Welensky was the author of the supportive statement to those who favored an independent Katanga. The Rhodesian Federal Government and Katanga had a special relationship with historical roots (See 220-232).

41. O'Brien, 217. Tshombe was willing to give full cooperation for ONUC actions in RUM PUNCH. "But he (Tshombe) asked us (the UN in Katanga), first, to end the 'temporary measures': the occupation of the post office and radio, and the house-arrest of Munongo. Since these measures were ancillary to the action for the removal of the mercenaries I (O'Brien) could only agree."

42. ONUC commander in Katanga found it impossible to do all the task required. The Irish company at Jadotville surrendered to Tshombe forces on 17 September 1961. Verrier, 72-73.

43. Abi-Saab, 148-149; O'Brien, 247-256; and, Rikhye, Hartbottle, Egge, 79-80. Hammarskjold was under increasing pressure. The British Ambassador

had given a demarche reference with drawn of support for ONUC on 13 September 1961. Hammarskjold was already in trouble with France and USSR. Public opinion also portrayed MORTHOR as much bloodier than it was. O'Brien, 268-269.

44. Rikhye, 80. See Lefever, 195-197, Appendix B, for full text of resolution S/5002. France and United Kingdom abstained in the 9 to 0 vote

45. Rikhye, Hartbottle, Egge, 80-81; and Verrier, 74-75.

46. Verrier, 74-75; Rikhye, Hartbottle, Egge, 81-82. Lefever covers the increasing clashed between ONUC and ANC/gendarmerie. Lefever, 104-106.

47. Lefever, 64, 91-92; Verrier, 61-63, 66-67.

48. Lefever, 107-112, and Verrier, 75-75. U Thant's Plan For Nations Reconciliation was "a four-phased program of national reconciliation to achieve a new federal constitution which would provide for a just division of revenues between the central and provincial governments, a reconstruction in the composition of the central government to allow for representation from all political and provincial groups, and a unification of the Congolese armed forces." Rikhye, Hartbottle, Egge, 82.

49. ONUC's forces were to be withdrawn the end of 1963. The General Assembly's approval retained forces untill 1965. Year Book UN - 1964, 92.

Even before ONUC forces withdrew rebellion started in Kwilu province, January 1964, under a former political associate of Lumumba, Piere Mulele. The following July the Popular Army of Simba rebellion created the situation that required foreign intervention once again into the Congo. See Major Thomas P. Odom, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964 - 1965, Leavenworth Paper No 14, Combat Studies Institute, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1988. Major Odom's work discusses the continued internal struggle in the Congo that resulted in American support for intervention by Belgian paratroopers in "one of the first hostage rescue missions of the cold war." ix.

50. Lefever, 122.

51. This difficulty is over come by the Uniting for Peace Resolution (3 November 1950) which calls for the General Assembly to act when "necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security" when the Security Council lacks the necessary unanimity to fulfill its responsibilities under the UN Charter. Rikhye, 29. Uniting for Peace Resolution was used in the 1950 Suez Crisis. However, movement from the

Security Council to the General Assembly does not always mean that the General Assembly will act faster or more impartial. See also Peacekeeping Handbook, III/17-III/18, and Abi-Saab, 19-20.

52. UN Charter Article 99 states "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matters which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." The Congo Central Government request to the Secretary-General was use by Hammarskjold for use of Article 99.

53. Lefever, 41, 190-191.

54. Lefever, 39-41.

55. Abi-Saab, 33-34; Lefever, 191-192..

56. Abi-Saab, 35.

57. Soviet attacks on Hammarskjold were due to the Soviet perception of the Secretary-General being supportive of the "colonialist," i.e. pro-west. The lack of direct support for Lumumba and failure to end the Katanga succession fueled this perception. The "troika" issue, three persons representing the military blocs of West, Socialist, and neutralist nations, was part of the Soviet concept of general disarmament Khrushchev tried to push at 15th General Assembly meeting. The concept created armed forces under the UN with a "troika." See Lefever, 49-50, and Urquhart, 457-470.

58. The four factions in January 1961 were Kasavubu in Leopoldville; Gizenga in Stanleyville; Tshombe in Elisabethville; and, Kalongi in South Kasai.

59. Urquhart, 511.

60. Lefever, 115-116.

61. Verrier, 51-52. See Urquhart, 488, for Hammarskjold's concern about a "Spanish Civil War" in the Congo.

62. Abi-Saab, 119.

63. Urquhart, 399. The first forces for the Congo were pulled from forces already in the existing UN Operation in Cyprus. Peacekeeping Handbook, III/9. Commander and staff came from the UN Truce Supervision

Organization (UNTSO). Durch, 334. Hammarskjold was dependent on specialist skills from other nations, such as Canada. Verrier, 59.

64. Urquhart, 404.

65. The informal meeting of the "Congo Club" gave rise to concerns by the Soviet Union and others about the perceived influence of the US. The "members" of this club at the start of the crisis were: Mr Narasimhan, Dr Bunche (US), Andrew Cordier (US), Dr Heinz Wieselhoff (US), Sir Alexander Mac Farquhar (UK), General Rikhye (India), Francis Nwakedi (Nigeria). Later additions were Robert Gardiner (Ghana) and Taieb Sahbani (Tunisia). See Abi-Saab, 51-53, O'Brien, 50-56, and Urquhart, 473.

66. Urquhart, 436-438.

67. Cohen and Gooch, 29; and, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 156-169. Chapter Five, "Critical Analysis."

68. Clausewitz, 156.

69. Cohen and Gooch, 46-57. These pages lay out the entire method.

70. Ibid., 233-246. This section provides a full explanation of learning, anticipation, and adaptation. The five historical cases used in their analysis are: US Antisubmarine Warfare in 1942; the Israel Defense Forces' action on the Suez Front and Golan Heights in 1973; the British 1915 Gallipoli operation; the Eight US Army's 1950 Korean operations; and, the 1940 French Army and Air Force operation.

71. Ibid., 240.

72. Cohen and Gooch, 239.

73. The background information is from FM 100-5, Chapter 13, pages 13-3 to 13-4, and Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, (Draft, Version 6), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army) Chapter 1, pages 1-13 to 1-18.

74. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990) 179. "In the traditional view, states give priority to military security to avoid threats to their survival." The actions of the Central Congolese government fits Nye's statement.

75. S/5002 reaffirmed the policies and purposes that the UN wanted to accomplish in the Congo.

"(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo.

(b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in restoration and maintenance of law and order.

(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo.

(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and

(e) To render technical assistance." Lefever, 195.

76. Arthur Burns, and Nina Heathcore, Peace-keeping by U.N. Forces, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961) 69. Hammarskjold had established this principle with the Suez Crisis.

77. Abi-Saab, 114.

78. Peacekeeper Handbook, III/16.

79. FM 100-23, 1-14, lays out three possible organizational arrangements: 1, unilateral US peace operations, requires US to act alone due to political or reaction time; 2, US as a lead nation, supported by international organization organization such as NATO; and, 3, US forces in a support role, to another nation or international organization.

80. Wurmser and Dyke, 55.

81. Rikhye, Hartbottle, and Egge, 83. The "purpose was for ONUC to restore law and order and enable the Congolese people to find their own destiny under their own government." The civilian operation in 1963 and 1964 were the largest in the history of the UN up till that time. Year Book UN - 1963 & 1964.

82. Ibid., 74.

83. Peacekeeping Handbook, III/21 - III/22. The handbook lays out the multidimensional effort required.

84. Ibid, IV/13.

85. O'Brien, 216 & 246. O'Brien discusses operations RUM PUNCH and MORTHOR. Khiari was acting under Linner's authority. Sture Linner

(Sweden) is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo (May 1961 to February 1962). Linner stated that he did not authorize Khiari, his emissary, to conduct MORTHOR. General McKeown, over all troop commander for ONUC, was also not informed of operation. See also Dayal, 268-269.

86. Urquhart, 576.

87. The problems for UN forces were great. Logistical support, transportation, communication, and intelligence were all extremely difficulty to obtain. For example "At one point there were some 3,000 vehicles of nearly ninety different makes and types." Lefever, 151. See Lefever's Chapter 5, "Operational Problems of the Force," 140-170.

88. Urquhart, 454-455.

89. Lefever, 198. Appendix C has the full text of "Agreement Between the United Nations and the Congolese Government." The agreement was initialled between the Congo Government and UN on 29 July 1960.

90.. Ibid., 144.

91. Rikhye, Hartbottle, and Egge, 88-89,95.

92. Urquhart, 403. This was the view of Hammarskjold as expressed by Urquhart. Hammarskjold saw the role of Secretary-General as that of Sun Tzu, "Constantly rebuffed but never discouraged.....helping people settle their differences, arguing against wanton attack and pleading for the suppression of arms, that the age be saved from its state of continual war.....undeterred they continued to force themselves on people's attention." Urquhart, 254-255.

93. Verrier, 55 & 56. Verrier makes a case for a "Kasavubu program" in which Hammarskjold because of his self-imposed limitations and need for US support became the unknowing tool of Kasavubu.

94. Ibid., 58-60; Durch, 335-336; and, Lefever, 140-152.

95. Since the Security Council "did not enjoin 'enforcement measures'" they did not meet the test. Burns and Heathcote, 66. "It (S/4741) is the only resolution ever passed by the UN Security Council that mandated the end of a civil war." David Wurmer and Nancy Bearg Dyke, The Professionalization

of Peacekeeping. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 25.

96. Rikhye, Hartbottle, and Egge, 92. The capture of 30 South African mercenaries at Kerbalo by UN forces provided information on the recruitment system and the location of centers in South Africa and European cities. Hammarskjold's approach closed down the centers and reduced the flow of mercenaries.

97. "With Hammarskjold dead, there also departed a degree of scruple about respect for the Charter." Burns and Heathcote, 66.

98. See Endnote 1.

99. Ibid., 37. "In peace operations, as the destruction of an opposing or belligerent force is not the object of the operation and its use will prejudice subsequent efforts at achieving settlement." FM 100-23, 1-20.

100. This difficulty is clearly expressed in Durch, 27. "It is this fragile political consensus behind the operation, and not the ambiguity of its instructions per se, that may endanger a field force should its operational circumstances deteriorate." FM 100-23, 1-10 to 1-11, lists three principal variables of the operational environment for peace operations; level of consent, level of violence, and level/degree of impartiality.

101. F.T.Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force. (Boulder: Lynner Rienner Publishers, 1992), 41.

102. FM 100-5, Chapter 5 "Combined Operations," presents the considerations of goals and objective, military doctrine and training, equipment, cultural differences, language, and, teamwork and trust. All these considerations are evident in ONUC and needed for peacekeeping operations. See also Robert W. Riscassi, "Principles for Coalition Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly 1 (Summer 1993): 58-71. Although GEN Riscassi focus is on combat operations, his principles apply to peacekeeping and reinforce FM 100-5.

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